Optimal child-related transfers with endogenous fertility by Simonovits, András
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES BUDAPEST, 2015 
 
MT-DP – 2015/14 
 
 
 
Optimal Child-Related Transfers 
with Endogenous Fertility 
 
ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS 
 2 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2015/14 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Optimal Child-Related Transfers with Endogenous Fertility 
Author: 
 
 
András Simonovits  
research advisor 
Institute of Economics - Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
also Mathematical Institute of Budapest University of Technology 
and Department of Economics of CEU 
e-mail: simonovits. andras@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2015 
 
 
ISBN 978-615-5447-73-0 
ISSN 1785 377X 
 3 
 
Optimal Child-Related Transfers with  
Endogenous Fertility 
 
András Simonovits 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
To compare the systems of child benefits and of family tax deductions, we create a model 
with endogenous fertility and a basic income, financed from proportional wage taxes. The 
deduction's efficiency is presumably lower than the benefit's and may even be lower than that 
of pure basic income.   
 
 
 
Keywords: progressive income tax, child benefits, family tax deductions, endogenous 
fertility 
 
JEL classification: J13 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
I have received generous financial support from Hungarian Science Research Foundation's 
project K 81482. I express my indebtedness for István Bessenyei, Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, 
Róbert Iván Gál, László Halpern and Volker Meier for their useful comments. This usual 
disclaimer applies. 
 4 
 
 
Társadalmilag optimális transzferek endogén  
termékenység esetén 
 
Simonovits András 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
A családi pótlék és a családi adókedvezmény rendszerének összehasonlításához egy modellt 
konstruálunk, amelyben a termékenység endogén és az alapjövedelmet arányos béradó 
fedezi. A kedvezmény hatékonysága feltehetőleg kisebb, mint a családi pótléké, és még a 
tiszta alapjövedeleménél is kisebb lehet. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: endogén termékenység, transzferrendszerek, személyi jövedelemadó, családi 
pótlék, családi adókedvezmény 
 
 
 
JEL kód: J13 
trafer3, direct, no framework
Optimal Child-Related Transfers
with Endogenous Fertility
by Andra´s Simonovits
February 27, 2015
Institute of Economics, CERS, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
also Mathematical Institute of Budapest University of Technology,
and Department of Economics of CEU
Budapest, Budao¨rsi u´t 45, Hungary
e-mail: simonovits.andras@krtk.mta.hu, telephone: 36-1-325-5582, fax: 36-1-319-3631
Abstract∗
To compare the systems of child benefits and of family tax deductions, we create a
model with endogenous fertility and a basic income, also financed from proportional
wage taxes. The deduction’s efficiency is presumably lower than the benefit’s and may
even be lower than that of pure basic income.
Keywords: progressive income tax, child benefits, family tax deductions, endogenous
fertility
JEL Numbers: J13
∗ I have received generous financial support from Hungarian Science Research Foundation’s project
K 81482. I express my indebtedness for Istva´n Bessenyei, Zsombor Cseres-Gergely, Ro´bert Iva´n Ga´l,
La´szlo´ Halpern and Volker Meier for their useful comments. This usual disclaimer applies.
i
1. Introduction
After the baby boom has petered out, below-reproduction fertility rates have become
a great problem in a number of developed countries. As a reaction, the concerned
governments have been using fertility-related transfer schemes to support families and
promote fertility. Note that these schemes vary across time and space. In addition to
free school and health care, various financial family support systems exist. To name
just the two main types: the child benefit is increasing with the number of children,
while the family tax deduction is a child benefit which only applies up to the income tax
obligation. Note that these fertility-related systems operate together with an income-
dependent tax system and even interact with the public pension system. In this paper,
we will create and analyze a model of optimal fertility-related transfers with endogenous
fertility.
To model such transfer systems, the framework of a Stackelberg-game is used: the
government announces a transfer rule, and calculating with the transfers, the workers
decide on their individual optima. Anticipating these reactions, the government deter-
mines the transfer rule by maximizing a social welfare function. (Even if the government
does not maximizes any social welfare function, this technique is appropriate for eval-
uating different transfer systems.) Taking into account individual and social budget
constraints calls for general equilibrium analysis.
In models of endogenous fertility (e.g. Becker, 1960; 1991 and Becker and Barro,
1988), when workers decide on their fertility, they consider that more children means
less adult consumption but more joy. As is usual, it is heroically assumed a unisex
world, where the number of children can be any positive real, including the irrational
number
√
2.
Though family support and pension appear as Siamese twins (e.g. Groezen, Leers
and Meijdam (2003), for short, GLM theoretically and Ga´bos, Ga´l and Ke´zdi (2009)
empirically), in this paper we shall neglect the latter and try to deepen the analysis of
the former. To study the properties of a child benefit system, one can neglect income
(wage) taxation. But to analyze a family tax deduction system, one needs to model a
tax system. And then it is natural to model wage heterogeneity as well. Unfortunately,
this dimension has been much neglected in the theoretical literature on fertility-related
transfers. Making up this omission is the main aim of the present paper. In contrast,
the applied modelers (e.g. Haan and Wrohlich, 2011) analyzed these complications in
much detail but they constructed the social welfare function to fit the real data rather
than the other way around.
Deviating from earlier models (e.g. GLM and Simonovits (2013)), we shall assume
that the raising costs are proportional to post- rather than pre-tax income or indepen-
dent of them. This modification greatly complicates the analysis but eliminates possible
paradoxes.
To simplify the analysis, either a child benefit system or a family tax deduction
system is studied. In our model, the income tax is simply a wage tax which is pro-
portional to the wage, direct redistribution among the adults is achieved via a uniform
basic income, while the child benefit is proportional to the number of children. For
simplicity, the parent’s utility function is an additive logarithmic function of the adult
consumption and of fertility.
Our social welfare function is the expected value of the workers’ maximal utilities,
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but a´ la Feldstein (1985), the paternalistic government typically attributes higher rela-
tive weight to the joy of having children than the parents do (represented by preference
parameter). Using a generalized utilitarian social welfare function, the redistributive
preferences could be studied as well. Since the (pre-tax) wages, the labor supply and
the share of reported earning are given, we also fix the tax rate, and look for the socially
optimal basic income, benefit rate and tax deduction rate as a function of the tax rate.
(Otherwise we could claim the social optimality of full income equality.)
We have only two qualitative analytical result for the child benefit system. Theorem
1: for any fixed tax rate and the paternalistic preference parameter and every wage,
the specific fertility rate is an increasing function of the child benefit rate, a decreasing
function of the basic income and again an increasing function of the balanced child
benefit rate. Moreover, the higher the wage, the weaker are these influences. Theorem
2: low enough benefit is better than no benefit at all. We add, however, two conjectures:
within bounds, for a fixed tax rate, 1) the more paternalistic the government or 2) the
higher the minimal wage, the higher is the optimal child benefit rate and the lower is
the optimal basic income.
Turning to the family tax deduction system and confining the examination to two
types, the optimal basic income and the tax deduction rate are independent of the
paternalistic preference parameter. Furthermore, when the tax rate rises, only the high-
wage workers’ fertility rises, and the average fertility is lagging behind the former’s rise.
Concerning the social welfare, the “optimal” family tax deduction system may yield
even a lower welfare than the pure basic income system, at least for progressive social
welfare functions. Note that we only support our conjectures by numerical examples.
We call the reader’s attention to our model’s limitations within the theoretical field:
sterility is neglected (for asymmetric information, see Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau,
2009), the labor supply is fixed (for flexible labor, see Fenge and Meier, 2009) and differ-
ences in the relative raising costs and the utility functions, especially in the parameter
of relative utility of a child are glossed over (cf. Simonovits, 2013). The role of social
norms are also neglected (for its analytical treatment, see e.g. Lindbeck, Nyberg and
Weibull, 1999; for a rich empirical discussion of developing countries, see Banerjee and
Duflo, 2011, Chapter 5). The activities occurring outside the market are especially
important in raising children (e.g. Lee and Mason eds. (2011) and Ga´l–Szabo´–Vargha,
2014) but they are also skipped over. Further research can only clarify how much the
message of the paper changes if one takes into account these complexities.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 investigates the special model of
child benefits. Section 3 discusses a similar model of family tax deduction and Section
4 concludes. An Appendix shows the pitfalls of two linearizations, either potentially or
actually used in the literature (e.g. GLM and Simonovits, 2013).
2. Child benefit
There is a unisex population, where adults give birth to children and pay taxes to finance
fertility-related transfers and a universal basic income. We assume that all the foregoing
functions are well-behaved, i.e. concave and smooth except at certain boundaries.
Every adult in our population is characterized by her pre-tax wage w, which is
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distributed according to a function F and the distribution defines a corresponding ex-
pectation operator E. Any adult can freely choose the number of her children, denoted
by n. There is a transfer system with two objectives: (i) to diminish pre-tax wage
inequalities and (ii) to finance a part of the raising costs: a worker earning wage w
and having n children, pays tax θw and receives basic income γ and child benefit ϕn.
Denoting the net-of-tax rate by θˆ = 1− θ, the net income is equal to
y = θˆw + γ + ϕn. (1)
We assume that the raising cost is proportional to the number of children and the net
income. Denoting the proportionality constant by pi, the raising cost is equal to piny,
therefore the adult consumption is given by
c = (1− pin)(z + ϕn), where z = θˆw + γ and n < 1
pi
. (2)
To avoid absurd cases, we assume that the child benefit is always nonnegative and not
greater than the raising cost: 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ piz.
Assume that any adult chooses her fertility to maximize an additive logarithmic
utility function
U(c, n) = log c+ ζ logn, (3)
where ζ > 0 is the relative individual utility of having children with respect to that of
adult consumption.
Inserting (2) into (3) yields the reduced utility function
u(n) = log(z + ϕn) + log(1− pin) + ζ logn. (4)
We assume that the workers neglect the impact of their decisions on the tax balance
described in (9) below.
Equating its derivative to zero provides the optimality condition
0 = u′(n) =
ϕ
z + ϕn
− pi
1− pin +
ζ
n
. (5)
Standard algebraic manipulations imply
Lemma 1. In a transfer system with basic income γ and child benefit rate ϕ, the
optimal fertility of a worker with a narrow income z = θˆw + γ is the positive root of
the quadratic equation
F (n,w, ϕ, γ) = (2 + ζ)piϕn2 + ζ¯(piz − ϕ)n− ζz = 0, where ζ¯ = 1 + ζ, (6)
namely
n(w,ϕ, γ) =
−B +√B2 − 4AC
2A
, (7)
where
A = (2 + ζ)piϕ, B = ζ¯(piz − ϕ) and C = ζz. (8)
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Remark. Though formulas (7)–(8) are helpful in the numerical calculations, their
analytical use is very limited. In contrast, (5) is very useful, it implies that—neglecting
general equilibrium effects, i.e. the dependence of the basic income on the benefit rate
in (9) below—the optimal fertility is an increasing function of the benefit rate ϕ and
a decreasing function of the wage w. We shall return to the general equilibrium at
Theorem 1.
Having finished the individual analysis, we consider the whole population with a
given wage distribution and assume that Ew = 1.
We shall now discuss the balance condition of the tax system providing positive
child benefits: on average, the tax is the sum of the child benefit and the basic income,
the former being the product of the child benefit rate and the fertility. The balance
equation is given by
θ = ϕEn(w,ϕ, γ) + γ. (9)
For a fixed θ > 0, one has to substitute (7)–(8) into (9), and solve the resulting implicit
equation for γ[ϕ]. No explicit solution exists except for no child benefit or for homo-
geneous wages studied below. From now on, we shall write n[w,ϕ] = n(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ] ] and
c[w,ϕ] = c(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ] ] in (2) and (9).
We expect that raising the child benefit rate, the basic income decreases and the
fertility rises, but we need to prove this conjecture.
Before continuing the general discussion, we present three very simple examples. We
start the discussion with the simplest example.
Example 1. If there is no child benefit: ϕ = 0, then the balance condition is
simply θ = γ. The introduction of a pure basic income has no fertility effect, because
the optimal (unbalanced or balanced) fertility is independent of the wage:
n0 = n(w, 0, θ) =
ζ
ζ¯pi
. (7o)
Next we continue with another very simple example.
Example 2. We have limited the child benefit rate as ϕ ≤ pizm, where zm = θˆwm+γ
is the narrow income derived from the minimal wage wm. In case of equality: ϕ = pizm,
Bm = 0, i.e. the fertility belonging to type wm is simply
nm =
1
pi
√
ζ
ζ + 2
. (7−m)
It is easy to see that (7-m) is an upper bound on fertility which is quite sharp for
the socially optimal child benefit rate if the tax rate is high enough to accommodate
ϕ = pizm and the paternalistic preference parameter is high enough.
Our last example is as follows.
Example 3. Assume homogeneous wages: w ≡ 1 and use notation θ˜ = θ− γ, then
z = 1 − θ˜ and (9) reduces to n = θ˜/ϕ. Inserting this into the optimum condition (6)
yields the inverse of γ[ϕ], namely
ϕ[γ] =
ζpi(1− θ˜)θ˜
θ˜ + ζ − (2 + ζ)piθ˜ , where pi <
θ˜ + ζ
(2 + ζ)θ˜
.
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In this degenerate example, we have determined an explicit but quite cumbersome
trade-off between the child benefit rate ϕ and the basic income γ.
Returning to the general model with heterogeneous wages and a fixed tax rate θ, we
shall prove
Theorem 1. For every wage, the specific optimal fertility is an increasing function
of the child benefit rate ϕ ≥ 0, a decreasing function of the basic income γ ≥ 0 and an
increasing function of the balanced child benefit rate on the appropriate interval [0, ϕM ]
defined as
θ = ϕMEn(w,ϕM , 0). (9−M)
Remark. The higher the wage, the weaker is the impact of the rise in the transfer
rates.
Proof. a) Consider the optimality condition (5) and increase ϕ, then the declining
curve shifts to the right, leading to a higher n(w,ϕ, γ). b) The opposite holds for γ.
c) To prove the third proposition, one needs calculate. Substituting n(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ])
into (9) and taking its total derivative with respect to ϕ results in
0 = En(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ]) + ϕEn′ϕ(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ]) + ϕEn
′
γ(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ])γ
′[ϕ] + γ′[ϕ]. (11)
Because n′ϕ > 0 > n
′
γ , (11) implies γ
′[ϕ] < 0. The balanced marginal change in the
fertility is equal to
d
dϕ
n(w,ϕ, γ[ϕ]) = n′ϕ + n
′
γγ
′[ϕ] > 0.
d) Since the right hand side of (9) is monotone increasing in ϕ, 0 = γ[ϕM ] has a
unique solution etc.
To choose the socially optimal transfer system, the government maximizes a pure
utilitarian social welfare function
V o[ϕ] = E[log c[w,ϕ] + ζ logn[w,ϕ] ] (10o)
or its paternalistic version (cf. Feldstein, 1985):
V [ϕ] = E[log c[w,ϕ] + ζ∗ log n[w,ϕ] ], (10)
where ζ∗ ≥ ζ is the paternalistic preference parameter. We shall prove that some
positive child benefit is socially useful.
Theorem 2. If ζ∗ > ζ, then socially optimal balanced child benefit rate is positive.
Proof. The basic idea is borrowed from the well-know proof of the envelope-
theorem. We shall show V ′[0] > 0. Taking the derivative of V in (10) with respect to ϕ
yields
V ′[ϕ] = E
z′ϕ[w,ϕ] + n[w,ϕ] + ϕn
′
ϕ[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ] + ϕn[w,ϕ]
+E
−pin′ϕ[w,ϕ]
1− pin[w,ϕ] + ζ
∗E
n′ϕ[w,ϕ]
n[w,ϕ]
.
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Using the individual optimality condition (5), multiplying it by n′ϕ[w,ϕ] and using
z′ϕ[w,ϕ] = γ′[ϕ], we obtain
V ′[ϕ] = E
γ′[ϕ] + n[w,ϕ]
z[w,ϕ] + ϕn[w,ϕ]
+ (ζ∗ − ζ)En
′
ϕ[w,ϕ]
n[w,ϕ]
.
We want to demonstrate the fraction in the first expectation of V ′[0] is zero. By (7o)
and (11), its numerator is γ′[0] + n[w, 0] = n[w, 0]− En[w, 0] = 0. The second fraction
is positive, therefore V ′[0] > 0.
As is usual, to compare the two systems—basic income combined with child benefits
and pure basic income—from a welfare point of view, we introduce the following concept:
the relative efficiency ε of the transfer system with respect to the pure basic income is
equal to that positive real number, multiplying the wages of the no-benefit system by
it, the welfare is equal to that of the benefit system with the original wages. Adding
an argument for the average wage ε in the social welfare function, the corresponding
equation for efficiency is
V (1, ϕ) = V (ε, 0).
Due to the special structure of the utility and the social welfare functions,
V (1, ϕ) = V (1, 0) + log ε, i.e. ε = exp(V (1, ϕ)− V (1, 0)).
To help the understanding of the system’s behavior, we shall display numerically the
dependence of the optimal outcomes on the balanced transfer rates. We have two types:
wL = 0.5 and wH = 2, with a common relative raising cost pi = 0.35 and population
shares fL = 2/3, fH = 1− fL = 1/3. We choose three values for the tax rate: θ = 0.1,
0.2 and 0.3 and three values for the paternalistic preference parameter: ζ∗N = 0.4 (no
paternalism), ζ∗W = 0.5 (weaker paternalism) and ζ
∗
S = 0.6 (stronger paternalism).
Since the social welfare functions are very flat around the optima, we tabulate their
values at steps 0.05 in the benefit rate. The approximate maxima are italicized.
As has been already mentioned above, for ϕ = 0, γ = θ and nW = nH = n0. For
θ = 0.1 (first block), the gap between low- and high fertilities grows together with the
balanced benefit rate. The efficiencies εN and εN are almost invariant to the transfer
rates, while εS is rising to 1.03. For θ = 0.2 (second block), the maximal fertility
1.166 of (7o) is approximated at ϕ = 0.15, namely 1.161. The inefficiency of the no
paternalism is visible, the efficiency of the weaker paternalism is weak, and that of the
stranger is strong. Finally, for θ = 0.3 (third block), the picture is sharper: the weaker
paternalism’s optimum lies around ϕ = 0.1 and the stronger paternalism’s optimum lies
around ϕ = 0.15, close to the maximum.
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Table 1. Impact of the child benefit rate for various θs and ζ∗s
No Weak Strong
F e r t i l i t y p a t e r n a l i s m
Tax Child Basic Low High R e l a t i v e
rate benefit r. income w a g e Average e f f i c i e n c y
θ ϕ γ nL nH n εN εW εS
0.1 0.00 0.100 0.816 0.816 0.816 1 1 1
0.05 0.055 0.933 0.848 0.904 0.998 1.008 1.018
0.10 0.000 1.061 0.882 1.001 0.990 1.010 1.030
0.2 0.00 0.200 0.816 0.816 0.816 1 1 1
0.05 0.155 0.922 0.850 0.898 0.998 1.007 1.017
0.10 0.102 1.039 0.886 0.988 0.991 1.010 1.029
0.15 0.038 1.161 0.924 1.082 0.978 1.006 1.034
0.3 0.00 0.300 0.816 0.816 0.816 1 1 1
0.05 0.256 0.914 0.852 0.893 0.999 1.008 1.017
0.10 0.203 1.021 0.890 0.977 0.992 1.010 1.028
0.15 0.141 1.133 0.931 1.066 0.981 1.007 1.034
Remark. ζ∗N = 0.4, ζ
∗
W = 0.5 and ζ
∗
S = 0.6.
We continue with two conjectures for any fixed tax rate θ. We assume that the
optimal benefit rate has not reached its maximum, namely pizm and the corresponding
basic income is positive.
Conjecture 1. The socially optimal child benefit rate is an increasing function of
the paternalistic preference parameter.
Conjecture 2. For a fixed paternalistic preference parameter ζ∗ > ζ, the socially
optimal child benefit rate is an increasing function of the minimal wage wm.
Anticipating the discussion of family tax deduction in Section 4, we introduce a
further important variable: the excess of child benefit over the tax, for short, excess
transfer, namely e = ϕn − θw. If it is positive, then the type’s tax falls short of her
child benefit. This is not to be confused with the transfer γ− θw arising in a pure basic
income system which can also be negative.
3. Family tax deduction
There are governments which are worried by the large transfers flowing from high-earner
workers (families) to low-earner ones through child benefits, especially at pronatalistic
policies. To mitigate this unwanted consequence, these governments replace child bene-
fits by family tax deductions. (It is possible to model a partial replacement but it would
unnecessarily complicate the analysis.) The essence of the family tax deduction is that
only the higher wage types can fully use it: any positive excess transfer e = ϕn(w)−θw
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is eliminated. As a result, the optimal family tax deduction rate and the basic income
are close, regardless of the tax rate.
The simplest formulation of the family tax deduction is as follows. Let ψ > 0 be
the child tax deduction rate, i.e. having n children, amount ψn can be deducted from
the proportional personal income tax θw, up to the maximum θw. To avoid absurd
cases, we assume that the family tax deduction is always lower than or equal to the
narrow raising cost: ψ = piz. Let t0 denote now the tax deducted: t0 = min(θw, ψn).
Obviously, if the benefit is so low or the tax rate is so high that even the minimal wage
earner’s tax amount is higher than the family tax deduction, then the latter reduces to
the child benefit. But this has already been covered in Section 3, therefore we assume
that θwm ≤ ψn, where wm is the minimal wage.
By definition, type w’s own consumption is equal to
c = (z + t0)(1− pin). (13)
We have now two domains; slack, denoted by S: θwS > ψnS and tight, denoted
by T : θwT 0 ≤ ψnT . (The status of the demarcation line θw = ψn is ambiguous.)
Correspondingly, t0S = ψn and t0T = θw. Then (13) branches off into
cS = (zS + ψnS)(1− pinS), zS = θˆwS + γ (13S)
and
cT = (wT + γ)(1− pinT ). (13T )
Then there are two separate regimes with their own fertility optima. Lemma 2
provides nS for ψ replacing ϕ in (7)–(8), while nT for ϕ = 0 and θ = 0, i.e. (7o). It can
be shown that nS(w) > nT . It is especially disturbing that the transition from S into
T is discontinuous: the optimal transfer drops a lot due to a minor tax rate rise!
To formulate the new balance condition, we repeat the argument leading to (9).
But now we take into account the partition along S − T , which depends on the para-
meter vector (w,ψ, γ). For convenience, we assume that the relevant functions nS(w)
and nT (w) are also defined outside their natural domains, being equal to zero outside
their proper domains. Subindexes S and T refer to these restricted expectations. The
reformulated balance equation is as follows:
θ = ψESnS(w,ψ, γ) + θETw + γ. (14)
Our social welfare function remains basically the same as above, only ψ replaces ϕ.
Due to its simplicity, it is worth discussing the two-type case of family tax deduction.
Example 4. In the two-type case, the low-wage type is tight, the high-wage type
is slack. Furthermore, at the social optimum, the low wage type’s family tax deduction
is equal to her tax: ψ∗nL = θwL. Inserting (7o), our optimality condition becomes
ψ∗ =
ζ¯piθwL
ζ
. (15)
The balance condition (14) can be simplified by making the following observation: since
the low-wage type deducts all her tax obligation, therefore the high-wage type’s tax is
used for financing her own family tax deduction and both types’ basic income:
fHθwH = fHψn(wH , ψ, γ) + γ. (14′)
Substituting (15) into (14’) and using (7)–(8) yield an equation for γ, regardless of the
paternalistic preference parameter ζ∗.
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It is easy to grasp that in general the optimal family tax deduction is far from being
socially optimal. Due to the elimination of the excess transfer, the low-wage type’s
fertility is as low as n0 in (7o) and the corresponding net income is only yL = wL + γ,
which is lower than in the pure basic income system: yoL = θˆwL + θ. The high-wage
type’s fertility is higher than n0 but the additional resource brings less gain in her
consumption and child welfare than the loss is in the low-wage type’s welfare.
We continue the numerical illustrations. Having a corner solution (at least in our
two-type model), now the socially optimal tax deduction rate and basic income are
independent of the key parameter of the social welfare function, ζ∗. We choose again
three parameter values: ζ∗ = 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6 which still influence the numerical value
of the efficiency. According to Table 2, the two socially optimal transfer rates are close
to each other for any tax rate. For example, at θ = 0.3, the tax deduction rate ψ∗ and
the basic income γ∗ are equal to 0.18 and 0.14, respectively. The rise of fertility is much
weaker than with the child benefits, but higher than in the pure basic income system.
The child benefit system is more efficient than the family tax deduction system, which
in turn is about as efficient as the pure basic income system.
Table 2. Impact of the optimal family tax deduction rate for various θs and ζ∗s
Family No Weak Strong
tax F e r t i l i t y p a t e r n a l i s m
Tax deduc- Basic Low High R e l a t i v e
rate tion r. income w a g e Average e f f i c i e n c y
θ ψ∗ γ∗ nL nH n εN εW εS
0 0 0 0.816 0.816 0.816 1 1 1
0.1 0.061 0.049 0.816 0.856 0.829 0.999 1.001 1.002
0.2 0.123 0.097 0.816 0.902 0.845 0.997 1.000 1.003
0.3 0.184 0.142 0.816 0.955 0.863 0.992 0.997 1.002
4. Conclusions
In our very simple model, assuming a pronatalistic government, the socially optimal
child benefit system achieves higher efficiency than the family tax deduction system and
even the pure basic income system may overtake the deduction system for a progressive
social welfare function, not discussed here.
We warn the reader on the limits of the model. We have used the simplest utility
function pair, two logarithmic functions. Even at the modest generalization into CRRA,
the independence of the fertility of the wage in Example 1 (no child benefit) disappears,
therefore the saving of Theorems 1 and 2 requires further nontrivial assumptions. The
neglect of the negative impact of taxation on labor supply and tax reporting further
weakens the force of our numerical examples. The inclusion of labor disutility and
flexible labor supply would make the model more realistic and determine the optimal
tax rate, would more fully highlight the differences between the two transfer systems.
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But this modification would complicate the analysis, therefore we have no used it here.
The heterogeneity of the relative raising cost also deserves an examination.
Appendix: Errors of linearization
In this Appendix, we shall present errors stemming from two linearizations—potentially
or actually used in the literature. We mostly concentrate on the quantitative errors but
the qualitative ones are also important.
1) Single linearization
There is always a temptation to simplify things, in our case, to linearize the adult
consumption equation (2):
c1 = z − (piz − ϕ1)n, where z = θˆw + γ. (A.1− 1)
Here c1 > c, therefore the approximate optimal fertility is higher than the true one.
Then (5) is replaced by
0 = u′(n) = − piz − ϕ1
z + (piz − ϕ1)n +
ζ
n
. (A.1− 2)
The optimal fertility is now simply
n1(w,ϕ1, γ) =
ζz
ζ¯(piz − ϕ1)
. (A.1− 3)
Note that for our upper bound ϕ1 = pizm mentioned in Example 1, the fertility is
infinite: the approximation breaks down.
Until now we have neglected the balance condition. To simplify the calculations, we
only consider the case of uniform wages: w ≡ 1 and take the basic income zero: γ = 0.
Then z = θˆ and the balance equation reduces to θ = ϕ1n1(θ, ϕ1). Inserting (A.1–3)
into the balance equation results in
θ = ϕ1
ζθˆ
ζ¯(θˆpi − ϕ1)
, i.e. ϕ1(θ) =
ζ¯θθˆpi
ζθˆ + ζ¯θ
. (A.1− 4)
2) Double linearization
Earlier papers (GLM and Simonovits, 2013) not only linearized the consumption equa-
tion but also made the raising costs independent of the net income:
c2 = z − (pi − ϕ2)n. (A.2− 1)
Incidentally, that way the error became smaller, because the elimination of the term
−pizϕ1n2 from (2) was countered by the deduction of pi(1 − z)n, which is positive for
GLM’s γ = 0 and w = 1, namely piθn.
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Returning to the general case, the optimal fertility (A.1–3) changes into
n2(w,ϕ2, γ) =
ζz
ζ¯(pi − ϕ2)
. (A.2− 3)
Comparing (A.2–3) with (A.1–3), we see that for low-wage types, z < 1, therefore for
ϕ1 = ϕ2, the fertility in (A.2–3) is lower than in (A.1–3) and vice versa.
Returning to uniform wages, the balance condition now reduces to
θ = ϕ2
ζθˆ
ζ¯(pi − ϕ2)
, i.e. ϕ2(θ) =
ζ¯θpi
ζθˆ + ζ¯θ
(A.2− 4)
etc. Comparing (A.1–4) and (A.2–4) implies ϕ1(θ) = θˆϕ2(θ) < ϕ2(θ).
Numerical comparison
Rather than struggling with analytical comparisons, we present our numerical results
in Table A.1. In column 2 the exact schedule ϕ(θ) is shown: while the tax rate rises
from 0.1 to 0.3, the benefit rate rises from 0.105 to 0.255. Column 3 displays the
corresponding fertility. In columns 4 and 5 (single linearization) the benefit rate and
the fertility are shown, respectively. As the tax rate rises, the benefit rate lags more and
more behind the correct value: 0.147 < 0.255, while the fertility overtakes the correct
one. In columns 6 and 7 (double linearization) the errors partly cancel each other: for
θ = 0.3, the new benefit rate 0.21 lies just around halfway between the correct (0.255)
and the approximate (0.147) values.
Table A.1. Nonlinear vs. linear raising cost equations
Tax N o n l i n e a r Linear 1 Linear 2
rate benefit r. fertility benefit r. fertility benefit r. fertility
θ ϕ n ϕ1 n1 ϕ2 n2
0.1 0.105 0.952 0.088 1.134 0.098 1.020
0.2 0.186 1.071 0.131 1.531 0.163 1.224
0.3 0.255 1.176 0.147 2.041 0.210 1.429
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